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RECENT DECISIONS
judicial opposition to needed social and economic legislation.22 Recent
Supreme Court decisions such as the Schware case,23 the Jenks case,24
Watkins v. United States, 5 and Yates v. United States,26 indicate a simi-
lar pendulum-like trend to reinstate and fortify personal liberty which was
sorely strained during the McCarthy era of "evangelistic" insecurity2 7
A dissection of the Konigsberg case reveals a pervading drive to but-
tress individual liberty rooted in a calmer societal approach to the ideolo-
gical foes of Americanism. The ease with which either the majority po-
sition or that of the dissenting opinions can be justified shows the free-
dom of the judiciary to mold the law into conformity with social patterns
without departing from the confines of legal precedent. Shakespeare's
comment, "The devil can cite scripture for his purpose" seems equally
applicable to the "law of the land."
SHELDON L. GREENE
ASSAULT AND BATTERY - LACK OF PARENTAL CONSENT TO
AN OPERATION AS A BASIS FOR LIABILITY
An eighteen year old girl called at the defendant-doctor's office to ar-
range for a plastic surgery operation on fher nose. Arrangements were
made for the operation, which was performed at a later date. After the
operation suit was brought by the minor patient against the doctor for
personal injuries. The basis of the claim was that the surgeon had not
obtained the consent of the minor's parents before conducting the opera-
tion. The plaintiff recovered a verdict -n the -trial court, but suffered a
reversal -in the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court, in affirming the lower tribunal held that per-
fornance of a surgical operation upon an 18 year old girl with her con-
'Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) lists the 14 reversals includ-
ing: Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942)
overruling Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906) etc.
' Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) holding that previous
membership in the Communist party is of itself insufficient grounds for exclusion
from the practice of law before a state bar.
'Jenks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) which made classified information
available to the accused for his defense.
"354 U.S. 178 (1957) questioning this activity of Congressional Investigating
Committees.
-354 U.S. 298 (1957) which indirectly qualifies Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951).
'See: Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) which restricts the "dear and
present danger" test, thereby facilitating this prosecution of Communists under the
Smith Act, 54 STAT. 670 (1940).
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sent will ordinarily -not amount to an assault and battery, even though the
consent of the girl's parents or guardian has not be obtained.1
As this is a case of first impression in Ohio, it is -ecessary to -look to
other jurisdictions for any expression of a general rule. It has been said
that,
... in the absence of an emergency an operation performed on a child
without the consent of the parents or persons standing in loco parentis is
a legal wrong.. 2
However, .there are only seventeen cases dealing directly or by dicta
with this problem. In two of these cases -the injured party was not a
minor,3 although both have been cited as precedent ,by other courts con-
sidering this point. In -four cases, -the issue of the necessity of parental
consent was never litigated,4 while another was not a personal injury
case.5 In the -remaining ten cases which squarely faced the problem, the
plaintiff won in only five.
The first important case arose in Michigan,6 and the holding was that,
under the circumstances, the consent of the minor without that of the
parent was sufficient. The court did not pass on the question of whether
a parent's consent is generally necessary. Likewise, when the problem
next arose,7 there was no definitive ruling that parental consent was
an absolute condition precedent to .the lawful performance of an operation
on a minor. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the operation
-upon the minor was not a technical assault, since an emergency existed,
and any consent that might be necessary would be implied. This "emer-
gency" exception has since been utilized by other courts to escape im-
posing liability upon a doctor.8
'Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E. 2d 25, (1956). The court was split
4-3 on this issue.
2 70 CORPUS JuRIs SECUNDUM, Physicians and Surgeons § 48g (2) (1951).
'Pratt v. Davis 118 Ill. App. 161 (1905); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104
N.W. 12 (1905).
'Perry v. Hodgson, 168 Ga. 678, 148 S.E. 659 (1929); Bishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich.
76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926); Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P. 2d 1018 (1936);
Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922).
'In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P. 2d 765, (1942). Adoption proceedings
were involved in this instance.
*Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906).
'Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912).
'Wells v. McGhee, 39 S. 2d 196 (La. App. 1949); and Sullivan v. Montgomery,
155 Misc. 448, 279 N.Y. Supp. 575, (City Ct. N.Y. 1935). In the former case the
court classified treatment of a fracured arm as an emergency, while in the latter
working on a twisted ankle was similarly classified. Both holdings are based upon
specious reasoning and obviously designed to avoid undesired results.
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The year 1913 saw the issue next arise.9 The court held, as a matter
of law, that the consent of a parent was a necessity and that an operation
without consent could not be performed on a minor without constitut-
ing at least a technical assault and battery. Unfortunately no independent
analysis of the problem was made by this court.
The Michigan Court was again faced with this problem some years
later, and held, as a matter of law, that, ordinarily, consent of a
parent must be obtained before an operation may be performed upon a
minor.'0 However, the court once again failed .to reanalyze the problem
and instead relied upon their own dogma as a rule of law.
The above-mentioned cases are .the foundation for the decisions or
dicta in the other eleven."1 Thus, it appears that the "well-settled" rule is
based on a very meager precedent and is unsupported by any rational
analysis of the problem by any court of record.
The instant case is truly the first in which the rule and its reasoning
are considered analytically. The minority opinion accords with the
orthodox rule that a parent's consent to an operation on a minor is a
necessity. The rule thus expressed is not based upon the legal capacity of
a minor to consent It is based upon a right belonging to the parents
whose liability for support and maintenance of their child may be greatly
increased by an operation which does not turn out well. This state-
ment is one of the first expressions of a rationale for the rule 'to be
found, and has some merit.
On the other hand, the majority points out that the doctrine of
"volenti non fit .injuria" has been held to apply to minors in Ohio.'2
The basic principle behind this doctrine is consent, both actual and im-
plied. Thus, if a minor cannot recover for a personal injury because of
his implied consent, then consent voluntarily and intelligently given
'Rishworth v. Moss, 159 S.W. 122 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913). The fallacy of this
case is that the only basis for the decision is the holding in the two prior Michigan
cases where no such rule had been promulgated and one other case in which no
minor was involved.
" Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935). The decision was supported
by three prior cases, two of which were not in point, and one of which was the
Rishworth case, supra, note 9.
'Bonner v. Moran, 126 F. 2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.
2d 474 (Ky. App. 1951); Wells v. McGehee, 39 S. 2d 196 (La. App. 1949);
Bishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926); Gulf & S.I.R. Co. v. Sulli-
van, 155 Miss. 1, 119 So. 501 (1929); Sulivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279
N.Y. Supp. 575 (City Ct. N.Y. 1935); Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P. 2d
1018 (1936); Zaman v. Schultz, 19 Pa. D.&C. 309 (Pa. App. 1932); Browning
v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568, 111 SE. 492 (1922); and In -re Hudson, 13 Wash.
2d 673, 126 P. 2d 765 (1942).
"Centrello v. Basky, 164 Ohio St. 41, 128 N.E. 2d 80 (1955); Porter v. Toledo
Terminal Rd. Co., 152 Ohio St. 463, 90 N.E. 2d 142 (1950).
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should be valid as a defense in an action of the nature present in the
instant case. It is further stated that in this state, if a girl over the age
of sixteen consents -to sexual intercourse, no rape will -have been com-
mitted. The majority also considers a bulk of the cases in point, and
distinguishes them on the basis of the age of the children involved there-
in, indicating that -the maturity of the plaintiff is a major factor. This
accords with the view that:
If a person whose interest is invaded is at the time by reason of his
youth or defective mental condition, whether permanent or temporary,
incapable of understanding or appreciating the consequences of the in-
vasion, the assent of such person is not effective as a consent thereto.h
Conversely, it then follows that if a person can understand the conse-
quences of the invasion, an assent should be effective.
As a result of this decision, it appears that the law in Ohio now is that
the consent of a minor may be a defense. However, it is dependent on
whether .the minor has the capacity to understand and appreciate the
nature of the act to which 'he consented.
The decision in the instant case is in 'line with modern life and ex-
perience, where so 'many "minors" approaching "maturity" have been
given greater freedom of action and decision 'by their parents and have a
greater awareness of personal responsibility -in their daily affairs. This is
not only a social phenomenon, but also a legal one. Other examples of
the law's recognizing maturity in children before the age of twenty-one
can be found in driver's license statutes, the draft and enlistment laws and
the marriage laws in some states.
This decision, moving away from strict 'liability to the more reasonable
ground of liability based on fault is a desirable one. Hopefully it may
find acceptance in other jurisdictions.
-DAVID PmBLRmAN
'REsTATEMBNT, TORTs, 5 59 (1934)
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